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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TERRY B. COGAN,

]

Plaintiff/Respondent,

]i

No.

890060-CA

vs.
LINDA S. COGAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals is authorized by Utah Code Ann. §782a-3 (2) (h) (1988) and Rules of Utah Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3(a)
(1988) to hear this appeal (domestic relations case) from the Third
District Court.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order dismissing Defendant's
Petition for Modification [of Divorce] (Record at 6) and Amended
Petition for Modification [of Divorce] (Record at 64).
appealed (Record at 83).

Defendant

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The Defendant/Appellant has raised the following issues on
appeal:
1.

Whether Defendant/Appellant can bring a petition for

modification and/or enforcement of a New Mexico Decree of Divorce
filed in Utah pursuant to the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
2.

Whether Defendant/Appellant is entitled to an award to

[sic] attorney's fees on appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

Defendant instituted this action by

filing a "Pcatition for Modification" against Plaintiff on or about
October 13, 1988

(Record at 6) and an "Amended Petition for

2

Modification" on or about January 13, 1989 (Record at 64). 1 In the
"Amended Petition" Defendant alleged:
a)

That the parties 1 divorce decree was entered in the State

of New Mexico in 1987.
b)

(Record at 64).

That Defendant had moved from New Mexico to Utah with the

parties' two minor children.
c)

(Record at 64). 2

That Defendant filed a copy of the New Mexico divorce

decree with the clerk of the district court of Salt Lake County,
Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22a-l (1988) .

(Record at 64) .

The record is somewhat confusing concerning whether
Defendant's "Amended Petition for Modification" was on file when
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss was argued to the District Court on
December 2, 1988 (Record at 5 2 ) . It appears from the record that
the Defendant's "[original] Petition for Modification" was filed
October 13, 1988 (Record at 6) and her "Amended Petition for
Modification" was filed on January 13, 1989 (Record at 64) after
the hearing and Order of Dismissal even though it appears that said
document was signed by Defendant's counsel on October 28, 1988
(Record at 68) — before the hearing and Order of Dismissal. For
the purposes of this appeal, Plaintiff's arguments will refer to
the "Amended" petition even though it appears from the record that
said document was not filed with the Court at the time the Motion
to Dismiss was argued and decided.
Plaintiff has reviewed the
"Petition" and "Amended Petition" and finds that the only changes
are that Defendant first requested alimony of $20,000 (Record at
7,9) and in the "Amended Petition" raised her request to $50,000
(Record at 65,67).
2

Defendant implied that she and the children had moved from
New Mexico to Utah; she states that she and the children are
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah.
Prior to said residency,
Defendant and the children lived in New Mexico with Plaintiff.

3

d)

That the Utah court should impose an alimony obligation

against Plaintiff and for Defendant since no alimony provision was
contained in the New Mexico decree.
e)

(Record at 65).

That the Utah court should increase the child support

obligation contained in the New Mexico decree against Plaintiff and
for Defendant.
f)

(Record at 65, 66).

That the Utah court should impose upon Plaintiff an

obligation to pay an IRS assessment as a "community indebtedness"
in accordance with the parties' decree of divorce.
g)

That the Utah court should require Plaintiff to pay

insurance deductibles
divorce.

(Record at 66) .

as required

by the parties' decree of

(Record at 67).

Disposition in the Lower Court.

Plaintiff moved the Third

District Court to dismiss Defendant's petition(s).

The motion was

duly briefed and argued to the Court on December 2, 1988.

Judge

Homer Wilkinson granted the motion from the bench (Record at 58,
59) and the formal Order dismissing Defendant's petition(s) was
entered December 16, 1988.

(Order, Record at 62).

Defendant's

appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1*

Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced in New Mexico on

January 2, 1987 (Decree, Record at 2-5, 34), and at the time of the
4

divorce both parties were residents of New Mexico (Record at 35).
Defendant never contested these facts in the Utah district court
proceeding.
2.

Sometime after the entry of the New Mexico decree,

Defendant moved herself and the parties1 minor children in her
custody from New Mexico to Utah.

(Record at 35).

Defendant never

contested these facts in the Utah district court proceeding.
3.
35).

Plaintiff continues to reside in New Mexico.

Plaintiff has always resided in New Mexico.

(Record at

(Record at 53).

Defendant never contested these facts in the Utah district court
proceeding.
4*

Plaintiff has never had any contacts with the State of

Utah by which long-arm personal jurisdiction can be based or
invoked.

(Record at 53). Defendant never contested these facts

in the Utah district court proceeding.3
5.
Petition

Plaintiff was personally
for

Modification

on

served with a Summons and

October

19,

1988

geographical boundaries of the State of New Mexico.

3

within

the

(Record at

At no stage of the proceeding did Defendant or Defendant's
counsel make any allegation that there was a basis for long-arm
jurisdiction whereby Utah could obtain personal jurisdiction over
Plaintiff. Defendant's brief on appeal (Appellant's Brief, p. 7)
does make an argument that there is sufficient long-arm
jurisdiction, however, Defendant did not make such an argument at
any stage of the Utah district court proceeding.
5

35).

Defendant never contested these facts in the district court

proceeding.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant should be barred from raising the "minimum contact"
argument on appeal.

Defendant did not raise that argument at any

stage of the district court proceedings, and did not raise the
argument

in

her

docketing

statement

or

motion

for

summary

disposition. Consequently, on appeal the Defendant cannot utilize
such "new" theory in an effort to show that the lower court erred.
Notwithstanding the argument above, the State of Utah does
not have personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff.

Therefore, Utah

cannot impose "new" financial obligations upon Plaintiff. Further,
the "contacts" alleged by Defendant are not sufficient to provide
Utah a basis for personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff, a resident
of New Mexico.
Application of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act in the present
case does not operate to provide Utah a basis

for personal

jurisdiction over Plaintiff.
Plaintiff, not Defendant, is entitled to an award of attorney
fees on appeal.

6

ARGUMENT
1.

DEFENDANT SHOULD BE BARRED FROM RAISING THE
"MINIMUM
CONTACT"
ARGUMENT4
ON
APPEAL.
DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE THAT ARGUMENT AT ANY
STAGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS, AND
DID NOT RAISE THE ARGUMENT IN HER DOCKETING
STATEMENT OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION.
CONSEQUENTLY, ON APPEAL THE DEFENDANT CANNOT
UTILIZE SUCH "NEW" THEORY IN AN EFFORT TO SHOW
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED.

Appellate

courts are courts of review; they

proceedings of the lower court.

review the

Review does not include matters

raised on appeal which were not presented during the lower court
proceedings.

Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 761 P.2d 932 (Utah

Ct. App. 1988); Rekward v. Indus. Comm'n, 755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) ; James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) ; First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University, 544

Appellant's brief is organized around two (2) "POINTS.11 The
first POINT argues that the Plaintiff has sufficient minimum
contact with Utah such as to form a basis for personal
jurisdiction; the first POINT then identifies what Appellant
considers to be seven (7) such minimum contacts; the first POINT
continues with an argument that such contacts constitute sufficient
minimum contacts; the first POINT concludes with a discussion of
the application the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. The second POINT
(Appellant's Brief, p. 16) argues that Appellant should be awarded
attorney fees on appeal.
7

P.2d 887, 892 (Utah 1975); Davis v. Mulholland. 475 P.2d 835 (Utah
1970)5.
In Simpson v. General Motors Corp,, 470 P.2d 399 (Utah 1970),
the Utah Supreme Court stated that the reason the above-stated rule
is followed in Utah is to maintain orderly procedure in the courts
with

the

ultimate

controversies.

purpose

being

the

final

settlement

of

The Court reasoned that a party must present his

entire case and theory to the trial court and, having done so, he
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and thus "attempt
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of litigation."

Id. at 401.

The above-stated Utah rule applies to the present case as
follows:

At the District Court proceeding, Defendant made no

written or oral argument that Utah had a basis for asserting
personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff.
that

argument.

Defendant's

sole

Defendant entirely avoided
rationale

for

personal

Davis sought to recover money he had paid for an option to
buy land. In support of his request for rescission, his theory at
trial was "mutual" mistake; on appeal, he added an new reason —
i.e., "unilateral" mistake. The Supreme Court seemed to disapprove
of the tactic concluding that even if Davis had presented the
"unilateral-mistake" theory at trial he could not have prevailed.
8

jurisdiction was her perceived application of the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act.6
On appeal, Defendant's "Docketing Statement" and "Motion for
Summary Disposition" and "Memorandum of Points and Authorities" (in
support of Motion for Summary Disposition) do not include any
argument that Utah had a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction
over Plaintiff. Defendant entirely avoided that argument. Again,
Defendant's

sole

rational

for personal

jurisdiction

was her

perceived application of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
Defendant now argues, for the first time (Appellant's Brief,
p. 7) , that Utah has personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff by virtue
of several enumerated "minimum contacts."
Defendant should be barred from raising the "minimum contacts"
argument on appeal.

Defendant did not raise that argument at any

stage of the Utah District Court proceedings and did not raise the
argument

in

her

Docketing

Statement

or

Motion

for

Summary

Disposition. Consequently, on appeal Defendant cannot utilize such
"new" theory in an effort to show that the lower court erred.

6

See transcript of "Oral Argument and Judge's Bench Ruling"
(Record at 52) ; "Amended Petition for Modification" (Record at 64) ;
and "Memorandum of Points and Authorities" (Record at 49).
9

2.

NOTWITHSTANDING ARGUMENT "1" ABOVE, THE STATE
OF UTAH DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER PLAINTIFF. THEREFORE, UTAH CANNOT IMPOSE
"NEW"7 FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS UPON PLAINTIFF.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates herein the "Memorandum
of Points and Authorities [et. al.],f which he filed with the Third
District Court in support of his Motion to Dismiss.

(Record at

34) .

3.

NOTWITHSTANDING
ARGUMENT
"1" ABOVE, THE
"CONTACTS" ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT ARE NOT
SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE UTAH A BASIS FOR PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF — A RESIDENT OF
NEW MEXICO.

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24 (1988) provides:
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102 ... who in
person or through an agent does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself ... to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
(6)
with respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the
marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding
subsequent departure from the state; or the commission
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so
long as that act is not a mere omission, failure to act,
or occurrence over which the defendant had no control;

7
f

The parties were divorced in New Mexico and the divorce
court s Decree of Divorce did not require Respondent to pay alimony
but did require Respondent to pay child support. Appellant then
moved to Utah and petitioned the Utah Third District Court to order
Respondent to impose alimony and increase child support (i.e.,
"new" financial obligations).
10

The "long-arm" jurisdiction statute provided above does not
support Defendant's position on appeal.
Defendant has not alleged any of the traditional indicia of
"sufficient minimum contacts."8
Plaintiff has never resided in the State of Utah. The parties
never resided in Utah as husband and wife. No "act[s]" giving rise
to the divorce claim were committed in Utah.

Further, no "act[s]fl

giving rise to the modification claim were committed in Utah.
Plaintiff has had one (1) contact with Utah in his life.

On

one occasion prior to marrying Defendant, Plaintiff drove through
Utah on his way to another state. Such a casual, happenstance, and
chance

contact

insufficient
contact."

to

with

Utah

constitute

is
a

both

minor,

long-arm

insignificant

jurisdiction

and

"minimum

Further, it was not done for the purpose of availing

See generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945) wherein the U.S. Supreme Court stated that before a
state can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant, the defendant must have certain "minimum contacts" with
the forum such that it does not offend "traditional notions and
substantial justice" to require the defendant to attend the forum.
The type of satisfactory contacts were enumerated in Hanson v.
Denkla, 375 U.S. 235 (1958) where the Supreme Court said that it
was essential that in each case there be some contact by which the
"defendant purposely avails himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit and
protection of its laws." Id. In other words, the contact has to
be voluntary and the contact with the state has to be for the
purpose of providing some sort of meaningful benefit to the
defendant such that the state is owed jurisdiction over his person.
11

Plaintiff "of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its laws."
Hanson at 235.
Notwithstanding argument "I11 above, Plaintiff now addresses
the "minimum contacts" alleged by Defendant.
Contact l:9

Defendant claims that the parties1 divorce was

obtained in New Mexico by Plaintiff.
While that is true, it has nothing to do with Plaintiff having
a contact with Utah.
Defendant

also

argues

that

if

Utah

awards

alimony

to

Defendant, she will not become a public charge in Utah.
Again, that has nothing to do with Plaintiff having a contact
with Utah.
Contact 2:10

Defendant claims that Plaintiff erroneously

prepared the parties1 1985 tax return which lead to an assessment
by the IRS against Defendant.
That claim has nothing to do with Plaintiff having a contact
with Utah.

To say that Plaintiff, while domiciled in the state of

New Mexico with his family in 1985, "purposely availed himself of

Appellantfs Brief, p. 10.
10

id.
12

the privilege of conducting activities within [Utah]" (See Hanson
at 235) by allegedly preparing a tax return, is not a reasonable
conclusion; it does not comport with what a sufficient minimum
contact is.

Plaintiff received no benefit from the state of Utah

by preparing his federal tax return in New Mexico or by filing it.
Defendant

further

claims that

she has been caused

financial

hardship.

That claim is merely an issue going to the merits of

Defendant's claim for modification of the divorce.
Contact 3;11 Defendant claims that the parties1 minor children
have moved to Utah and reside in Utah with Defendant and attend
public schools in Utah.
That claim does not, as a matter of law, constitute a
sufficient minimum

contact.

In Kulko v.

Superior

Court of

California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), a New York man permitted his minor
daughter to move to California to live with his ex-wife, the
child's mother.

By doing so, he did not purposely avail himself

of any benefits or protection of California law.

The Court found

that:
We cannot accept the proposition that [the father's]
acquiescence in [the daughter's] desire to live with her
mother in [the non-marital state] conferred jurisdiction
over [the father] in the [non-marital state]. A father
who agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his
children's preferences, to allow them [sic] to spend more
11

Id.
13

time in [the non-marital state] than was required under
a separation agreement can hardly be said to have
'purposefully availed himself1 of the 'benefits and
protections1 of [the non-marital state's] laws. (Citing
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S., at 216.12
Accordingly, California did not have personal jurisdiction
over the man.13
In the present action, to say that Plaintiff acquiesced in his
children moving from New Mexico to Utah with Defendant is not to
say

that he

"purposely

availed

himself

of

the privilege

of

conducting activities within [Utah]11 or that he thereby "[invoked]
the benefit and protection of its laws."

See Hanson at 235.

Plaintiff's supposed contact is too remote and too far removed to
amount to a sufficient minimum contact with Utah.
Defendant

cites

(Appellant's

Brief, p.

13) Johansen

v.

Johansen, 305 N.W. 2d 383 (S.D. 1981) for the proposition that a
state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident father
where he purposefully failed to support his minor child, and where
his wrongful

conduct

"tipfped] the

scales

of

fair play

and

Footnote 7 at page 94 of Kulko states that though services
(e.g., police and fire protection) were provided to the child by
the non-marital state (California), the services were essentially
benefits to the child, and in any event were not benefits that the
father purposefully sought for himself.
Appellant's brief (p. 15) cites the dissent in Kulko,
however such dissenting opinion does not have stare decisis effect.
14

substantial

justice

decidedly

in

the

favor

of

sustaining

jurisdiction. Id. at 387.
In the present case, Plaintiff is current paying his child
support obligation and no arrearage has been alleged.

Further, in

the present case Utah's long-arm statute14 is controlling.

Under

our statute Utah cannot assert long-arm jurisdiction over Plaintiff
unless he committed in Utah "an act giving rise to [Defendant's]
claim."
Plaintiff has committed no acts in Utah.
Defendant also cites15 In re Hazen and Henderson, 702 P. 2d
1143

(Or. Ct. App.

1985) , but

that

case

is

obviously

and

immediately distinguishable on its facts because therein both
parties moved from the marital state with the mother and child
going to Oregon and the father going to Ohio.

The Oregon court

sustained personal jurisdiction over the father because, inter
alia,

he

visited

the

child

in

Oregon.

The

Hazen

court

distinguished the facts therein from the facts in Kulko by saying:
This [Hazen] case is factually distinguishable from
Kulko. There, the husband wanted the issues litigated
in New York, the state of the marital domicile and the
place where the separation agreement had been executed.

See page 10 above.
15

Appellant's brief, p. 13.
15

There was no evidence that the husband had visited the
children in California,
Contact 4:16
pay

certain

Defendant claims that Plaintiff is obligated to

medical

and

health-care

expenses

for

the

minor

children, and that Plaintiff's failure to pay said expenses "could"
impact local health-care providers.
That claim does not constitute a contact with the State of
Utaho

What "could" happen and what has happened are two entirely

different things; what "could" happen is purely speculative and
only amounts, at best, to a "pre-contact" — not an actual contact.
Contact 5:17

Defendant claims that Plaintiff has been paying

child support directly to Defendant and is current in his payments
and that no claim for arrearage has been made.
That claim has nothing to do with Plaintiff having a contact
with Utah.

If Defendant's argument was held to establish that

Plaintiff has a sufficient contact with Utah, it would have a
chilling effect on support payments to Utah families by nonresident fathers.

Public policy mandates that payment of child

support by a non-resident not be considered as a minimum contact

Appellant's Brief, p. 11.
16

sufficient to invoke personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
payor.
Contact 6:18 Defendant claims that Plaintiff has court-ordered
visitation

rights with

the minor children

and

that

it

"can

reasonably be expected" that he will visit them in Utah.
That claim has nothing to do with Plaintiff having a contact
with Utah.

First of all, he has not visited the children in Utah.

As discussed above, Plaintiff has never visited anyone in Utah.
What he might do in the future is purely speculative, and does not
constitute a "contact" with Utah.
Defendant further claims that Plaintiff will be required to
pay the childrens' transportation from Salt Lake City to Roswell,
New Mexico.

That claim has nothing to do with Plaintiff having a

contact with Utah.
Contact 7:19

Defendant claims that the parties are obligated

to keep each other informed concerning the children which "could"
result in interstate communication initiated by Plaintiff to the
State of Utah via telephone or mail.

18

id.

19

Id.
17

Many
telephone

courts

have

rejected

communications

the

and/or

mail

argument

that

constitute

a

interstate
basis

for

invoking personal jurisdiction against a non-resident of the forum
state*

See generally Gagner v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 450

F.Supp. 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc., 640
F.2d 77, 79 (7th Cir. 1981); and Blue Ball Properties, Inc., v.
McClain, 658 F.Supp. 1310 (D. Del. 1987).
Furthermoref what Plaintiff might do in the future is purely
speculative and does not constitute a "contact" with Utah.

To say

that Plaintiff might call Defendant on the phone while Defendant
resides in Utah does not mean that he will "purposely avail himself
of the privilege of conducting activities within [Utah]" or that
he will thereby "[invoke] the benefit and protection of its laws."
Hanson, 375 U.S. 235 (1958).

Furthermore, Utah public policy

dictates that a non-resident father should remain in contact with
his children via the telephone and interstate mails without the
risk of being brought into Utah for post-divorce proceedings.

4.

THE UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT DOES NOT APPLY
IN THE PRESENT CASE TO PROVIDE UTAH A BASIS FOR
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF.

Defendant's final argument in POINT I of her Brief (p. 15) is
that the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, as interpreted by Bradford v.

18

Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988), establishes a basis for personal
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff in the present case.
As Plaintiff reviews the Bradford case, he can find absolutely
nothing therein to support Defendant's position.

Defendant's

reliance on Bradford is an error.
While it is true that Defendant has a New Mexico judgment that
she wants to modify in Utah against her non-resident ex-husband,
she fails to recognize that the Utah Foreign Judgment Act is not
designed for that purpose.

Rather, the Act is designed to assist

non-resident judgment holders in collecting their judgments against
Utah residents.
In Bradford, a default judgment was taken by Mississippi
residents against a Utah resident in a Mississippi court. When the
Mississippi residents attempted to enforce their judgment against
the Utah resident in Utah, a Utah district court vacated the
Mississippi default judgment.

On appeal, it was found that even

though the Utah resident had some contacts with Mississippi, such
contacts "were insufficient under the due process clause to support
that state's exercise of personal jurisdiction."

Id.

Bradford appears to support Plaintiff's position on appeal;
it does not support Defendant's position.
Due process requires that before a court can
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant, the defendant must
19

have purposefully established minimum contacts
with the forum state." Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff has had no contacts with Utah.
While a foreign judgment filed in Utah "is treated in all respects
like a judgment of the district court of Utah and is therefore
•

•

•

•
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subject to being vacated and set aside in a like manner,"

•

that is

not factually equivalent to the present case.
In the present case, a Utah resident filed a foreign judgment
in Utah and then filed a petition to modify it.
to impose alimony and

Defendant seeks

increase child support against a non-

resident.
Further, the "Full Faith and Credit" clause only applies to
enforcement of judgments and is not to be taken to require a court
in a second state to give more force and effect to a judgment than
the judgment would have in the courts in the state in which it was
rendered.
Defendant appears to take the position that she can utilize
the Foreign Judgment Act for the purpose of imposing "new"21
financial obligations against Plaintiff even though Utah does not
have personal jurisdiction over him.

See footnote 2 herein.
20

The error in Defendant's

reasoning is found by looking at the purpose of the Foreign
Judgment Act which is to enable non-residents to utilize Utah
courts to "enforce" the orders and judgments of sister-state courts
against Utah residents.

Clearly, Plaintiff's reliance on the Act

is not to "enforce" the New Mexico decree; she wants to impose
"new" financial obligations on Plaintiff which his home state of
New Mexico did not order, and which Utah may not order because of
the lack of personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff.

5.

PLAINTIFF, NOT DEFENDANT, IS ENTITLED TO AN
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

Defendant cites Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650
(1952) to encourage the Court of Appeals to award her attorney's
fees against Plaintiff.
Stuber has nothing to do with the granting of attorney's fees
on appeal. In Stuber, the Supreme Court merely recognized that the
trial court's award of attorney's fees was appropriate where the
husband's income was higher than the wife's and where the husband's
failure to abide by the divorce decree had forced the wife to
commence her post-divorce action.

.Id. 244 P.2d at 652.

The facts in Stuber (relating to the award of attorney's fees)
are not found in the present case.

21

As to Plaintiff's right to attorney's fees from Defendant on
appeal, Plaintiff does not believe that this appeal has been
initiated in good faith for the reason that Defendant has not
presented a plausible position.

Plaintiff can only conclude that

Defendant's motive has been to "wear down" Plaintiff's resolve and,
thereby, motivate Plaintiff to submit to Utah's jurisdiction.
Obviously, Defendant, as a new-resident of Utah, can carry on her
legal maneuvers against Plaintiff more economically on her Utah
turf than she can by returning to New Mexico to do so.
Based upon Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1988), Defendant should
be required to pay the attorney's fees and costs incurred by
Plaintiff in this appeal and in the proceedings before the Third
District Court.

CONCLUSION
The District Court ruling was correct and for the foregoing
reasons the dismissal of the Defendant's claims should be upheld
and costs and attorney fees awarded to Plaintiff pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1988).
DATED this 1st day of July, 1989.
/

.

-

••.

Randall J. Holmgren
Attorney for Plaintiff
22
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ADDENDUM
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
i U The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
ail e\traordinaiy writs and to issue all writs and process necessary
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees, or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal aajudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
(b) appeals from the district court review of
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies,
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court,
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record m criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony,
(0 appeals from district court in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony,
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extiaordinary writs involving a criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree-or capital felony,
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited
to divorce, annulment property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity,
(1) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and
0) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court, may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings
1988

FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT
Section
78-22a-l
7S 22a-2
7S-22a-3
78-22a-4
7S-22a-5
78-22a-6
7S-22a-7
78-22a-8

Short title
Definition — Filing and status of foreign
judgments
Notice of filing
Stay
Lien
Optional procedure
Fees
Uniformity of interpretation

78-22a-l. Short title.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as
the "Utah Foreign Judgment Act"
1983
7S-22a-2.

Definition — Filing and status of foreign judgments.
(1) For purposes of this chapter, "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order of a
court of the United States or of any other court whose
acts are entitled to full faith and credit in this state
(2) A cony of a foreign judgment authenticated in
accordance with an appropriate act of Congress or an
appropriate act of Utah may be filed with the county
clerk of any county in Utah The clerk of the district
court shall treat the foreign judgment in all respects
as a judgment of a district court of Utah A judgment
filed under this chapter has the same effect and is
subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying,
as a judgment of a distnct court of this state and is
subject to enforcement and satisfaction in like manner.
1983
78-22a-3. Notice of filing.
(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor, at the tune of filing a foreign judgment, shall file
an affidavit with the clerk of the district court stating
the last known post-office address of the judgment
debtor and the judgment creditor
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and afii
davit, the clerk of the district court shall notify the
judgment debtor that the judgment has been filed
Notice shall be sent to the address stated in the affidavit The clerk shall record the date the notice is
mailed in the register of actions The notice shall include the name and post-office address of the judgment creditor and the name and address of the judgment creditor's attorney, if any
(3) No execution or other process for the enforcement of a foreign judgment filed under this chapter
nay issue until 30 days after the judgment is filed
1966

78-22a-4.

Stay.

(1) If an appeal from a foreign judgment is pending, the time for appeal has not expired, or a stay of
execution has been granted, the court, upon proof
that the judgment debtor has furnished security for
satisfaction of the judgment in the state in which the
judgment was rendered shall stay enforcement of the
judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for
appeal expires, or until the stay of execution expires
or is vacated
(2) If the foreign judgment debtor, upon motion,
shows the district court any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of a distnct court of this
state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment upon the posting of security in the kind and amount required to stay enforcement of a domestic judgment
1983
78-22a-5. Lien.
(1) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter becomes a hen as provided in Section 78-22-1 if a stay of
execution has not been granted
(2) If the requirements of this chapter are satisfied,
the foreign judgment becomes a hen upon the judgment debtor's property on the date it is docketed
1986

78-22a-6. Optional procedure.
This chapter shall not be construed to impair a
judgment creditor's right to bring an action in this
state to enforce such creditor's judgment.
1983
78-22a-7. Fees.
Fees for docketing, transcription, and other enforcement proceedings with respect to foreign judgments shall be as provided m Sections 21-2-2, 21-2-3,
and 21-2-4
1963
78-22a-8. Uniformity of interpretation.
This chapter shall be construed to effectuate the
general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it
1983

78-27-24.

Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts
submitting person to jurisdiction.
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who
in person or through an agent doeb any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from
(1) the transaction of any business within this
state,
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in
this state,
(3) the causing of any injury within this state
whether tortious or by breach of warranty,
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any
real estate situated in this state,
(5) contracting to insure any person, property,
or risk located within this state at the time of
contracting,
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in
the marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from the
state, or the commission in this state of the act
giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not
a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence
over which the defendent had no control, or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse
within this state which gives rise to a paternity
suit under Chapter 45a, Title 78, to determine
paternity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support.
1987

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action
or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith, except under Subsection (2)
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees
or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1),
but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of
impecuniosity m the action before the court, or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for
not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1).
1988

TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND
ORDERS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. As defined and pro\ided b\ la\s an appeal ma\ be taken from the final orders and judgments of a
district court juvenile coui t, oi circuit court to the Court of Appeals by filing a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is
raken within the time allowed b> Rule 4 Failure of an appellant to take any
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as the Court of
Appeals deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or
other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or an order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or join in an appeal of
another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal Such joint appeals
may thereafter proceed and be treated as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the Court of Appeals
on its own motion, on motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the respondent The title of the action
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the Court of Appeals In original proceedings m the
Court of Appeals, the party making the original application shall be known as
the plaintiff and any other party as the defendant
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal, shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from, shall name the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate that the appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals.

